

*Multistate Performance Test*

*February 2019*

*MPTs and Point Sheets*

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**State of Franklin Department of Children and Families v. Little Tots Child Care Center**

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*February 2019*  
*MPT-1 File*

*State of Franklin Department of Children and Families v.*  
*Little Tots Child Care Center*

***Fisher & Mason Law Office***  
953 N. Main St.  
Evergreen Heights, Franklin 33720

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Examinee  
**From:** Gale Fisher  
**Date:** February 26, 2019  
**Re:** Little Tots Child Care Center

We represent Ashley Baker, who became the owner and operator of the Little Tots Child Care Center eight months ago. She has received notice that, in seven days, the Franklin Department of Children and Families (FDCF) will revoke her license to operate the child care center. Because she has no administrative remedy, we have filed a complaint to challenge the license revocation and a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the revocation until a trial can be had on the merits. The court has set a date 90 days from today for a trial on the merits. The hearing on the preliminary injunction is this Friday.

At the hearing, I expect to call Ms. Baker and Jacob Robbins, a parent, as witnesses. I have attached a note Ms. Baker gave me outlining her proposed testimony. I have also attached recent communications concerning Little Tots and three Notice of Deficiency reports issued by FDCF within the last seven months. I expect that FDCF will oppose our motion and will call the inspectors to testify to what they found during the inspections.

Please prepare the argument section of our brief in support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin FDCF from revoking Ms. Baker's license to operate Little Tots. Follow our office guidelines in drafting your argument. Do not assume that we will have an opportunity to file a rebuttal brief; anticipate any arguments FDCF may make and address them. Be sure to address all the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Because judges must make specific findings as to the evidence relied upon in granting or denying motions for a preliminary injunction, you must marshal and discuss the evidence we have available in support of the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Do not include a separate statement of facts, but be sure to incorporate the relevant facts into your argument.

*Fisher & Mason Law Office*

**OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

**To:** All lawyers  
**From:** Litigation supervisor  
**Date:** August 14, 2016  
**Re:** Guidelines for drafting persuasive briefs

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All persuasive briefs in support of motions shall conform to the following guidelines:

**Statement of the Case:** [omitted]

**Statement of Facts:** [omitted]

**Body of the Argument**

Analyze applicable legal authority and persuasively argue how both the facts and the law support our client’s position. Supporting authority should be emphasized, but contrary authority should also be cited, addressed in the argument, and explained or distinguished. Do not reserve arguments for reply or supplemental briefing. Be mindful that courts are not persuaded by exaggerated or unsupported arguments.

Organize the arguments into their major components and write carefully crafted subject headings that illustrate the arguments they cover. The argument headings should succinctly summarize the reasons the tribunal should take the position we are advocating. A heading should be a specific application of a rule of law to the facts of the case and not a bare legal or factual conclusion or statement of an abstract principle. For example, improper: “The plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies.” Proper: “When the plaintiff failed to appear at the administrative hearing, after receiving notice of the hearing, and failed to request a continuance, the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.”

Do not prepare a table of contents, a table of cases, or an index.

**Ashley Baker's Note on Proposed Testimony**  
**February 25, 2019**

Eight months ago, I took over the Little Tots Child Care Center to offer services no one else offered in our area. The former owner had a hard time meeting expenses because so many parents could not afford the fees. Little Tots is open more hours than most child care centers so that parents who go to work early or work late shifts can use the center. I applied for and received a government grant to subsidize the center. The grant allows me to charge reduced fees to parents whose income falls below a certain level. The grant also allowed me to hire more staff and expand the number of children Little Tots serves. Little Tots is the only child care center in this neighborhood that serves low-income families.

I have had to juggle this expansion while trying to meet all the state standards. Look at these Notice of Deficiency reports, and you will see that I have been improving all along. If I could have just a few more weeks, I would be able to comply with all the standards.

I understand the need to get completed enrollment forms so that no unauthorized persons pick up the children. We do not want predators or parents with restraining orders coming here. Most parents have completed the enrollment forms. I guess I was too patient with those five who did not complete them. I will have to sit down with these five parents and have them complete the forms when they pick up their children.

Child "A" has been with us for months. He's five; he knows he's allergic to milk and can't drink it. He's never tried to take the milk. But I will improve the supervision when food is out. I found an online education program for child care workers on food safety and will have the staff watch it.

The program we offer is excellent. In fact, since I became the owner and expanded the enrollment and improved the child care program, the State University Early Learning Center has been sending students to observe our program. The children are safe and are thriving, even if we've had some missteps while we expanded. For FDCF to come in now and close me down is too harsh.

Caring for children is my passion and my livelihood. If I'm forced to close, I will be without any income, will lose that grant, and will have to find a way to repay my business loans. I risk losing my clients if the court takes too long to resolve this. If my license is revoked, I don't know where these children are going to go or what I will do to make a living. I'm afraid that I would not be able to reopen the child care center even if I got the license back.

**STATE OF FRANKLIN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES**

Northern Regional Office  
830 Highway 17  
Evergreen Heights, Franklin 33720

February 22, 2019

Ms. Ashley Baker  
Little Tots Child Care Center  
492 Oak Street  
Evergreen Heights, Franklin 33705

**NOTICE OF LICENSE REVOCATION**

You are hereby notified that, effective March 5, 2019, the license issued to you to operate Little Tots Child Care Center will be revoked due to numerous and repeated instances of noncompliance with critical standards for the operation of a child care center as specified in the Franklin Administrative Code and as authorized by the Franklin Child Care Center Act, Fr. Civil Code § 35.1 *et seq.* You must cease operating the Little Tots Child Care Center on or before March 5, 2019.

The instances of noncompliance are specified in the attached NOTICES OF DEFICIENCIES.

Operating a child care center without a license is a violation of the Franklin Child Care Center Act.

Signed: 

Carla Ortiz  
Director, Department of Children and Families

Served by email and in person February 22, 2019, by Cynthia Wood.

**STATE OF FRANKLIN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES**  
**July 16, 2018, Notice of Deficiencies: Little Tots Child Care Center**

This report summarizes the noncompliance with critical standards observed during the July 16, 2018, inspection of the Little Tots Child Care Center, 492 Oak Street, Evergreen Heights, Franklin. This constitutes notice pursuant to § 3 of the Franklin Child Care Center Act.

Thirty days ago, Ashley Baker became the owner and operator of Little Tots Child Care Center. Upon assuming ownership, Ms. Baker expanded the number of children in the center and changed some of its operations. This is the first inspection since Ms. Baker became owner. Because of critical deficiencies observed during this inspection, Ms. Baker was warned of the need to improve and was told that, as a result, the center will be inspected every 90 days.

Little Tots has a maximum allowable enrollment of 96 children, in eight rooms: two rooms of 2-year-old children, two of 3-year-old children, two of 4-year-old children, and two of 5-year-old children. It employs 19 persons. Children may attend from 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

Noncompliance with Critical Standards

**Enrollment procedures.** Enrollment forms for 37 children were incomplete in that they lacked information identifying those persons authorized to pick up those children. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.06. Ms. Baker promised to correct this “very soon.”

**Staff qualifications.** A review of the employee personnel files revealed that there was no documentation indicating that a background check had been conducted on four of the teachers—Anders, Dunn, Green, and Hanes. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.12. Ms. Baker promised to “get to it soon.”

**Staffing.** The staff/child ratios in the 2-year-old and 3-year-old rooms exceeded what is allowed. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.13. There were nine children and one staff member in each of the 2-year-old rooms and 11 children and one staff member in each of the 3-year-old rooms. Ms. Baker indicated that this would be corrected “very soon.”

Signed: 

Trent Banks, FDCF Child Care Center Inspector

**COPY OF NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY REPORT GIVEN TO OWNER/OPERATOR**



**STATE OF FRANKLIN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES**  
**October 19, 2018, Notice of Deficiencies: Little Tots Child Care Center**

This report summarizes the noncompliance with critical standards observed during the October 19, 2018, inspection of the Little Tots Child Care Center, 492 Oak Street, Evergreen Heights, Franklin. This constitutes notice pursuant to § 3 of the Franklin Child Care Center Act.

Noncompliance with Critical Standards

**Enrollment procedures.** Enrollment forms for 16 children were incomplete in that they still lacked information identifying those persons authorized to pick up those children. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.06. Ms. Baker again promised to correct this “right away.”

**Staff qualifications.** A review of the employee personnel files revealed that there was no documentation showing that a background check had been conducted on two of the teachers, Anders and Dunn, or for newly hired teacher Kane. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.12. Ms. Baker promised to “get to it soon.” She also said that Anders is a holdover from the previous owner and should have had the background check done long ago.

**Staffing.** There were nine children in one of the 2-year-old rooms, with one staff member. This exceeds the allowable staff/child ratio. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.13. Ms. Baker indicated that she was still organizing her staff.

Signed: *Jerome Waters*

Jerome Waters, FDCF Child Care Center Inspector

**COPY OF NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY REPORT GIVEN TO OWNER/OPERATOR**

**STATE OF FRANKLIN DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES**  
**January 23, 2019, Notice of Deficiencies: Little Tots Child Care Center**

This report summarizes the noncompliance with critical standards observed during the January 23, 2019, inspection of the Little Tots Child Care Center, 492 Oak Street, Evergreen Heights, Franklin. This constitutes notice pursuant to § 3 of the Franklin Child Care Center Act.


Noncompliance with Critical Standards

**Enrollment procedures.** Enrollment forms for five children were incomplete in that they lacked information identifying those persons authorized to pick up those children. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.06. Ms. Baker said that she had given the forms to these five parents but had not yet received them back.

**Staff qualifications.** A review of the employee personnel files revealed that there was no documentation indicating that a background check had been conducted on teacher Anders or newly hired teacher Marin. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.12. Teacher Dunn is no longer employed at the center. Ms. Baker again said that Anders was hired by the previous owner and that the background check should have been done then.

**Staffing.** There were nine 2-year-old children in one room, with one staff member. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.13. Ms. Baker said that one child was due to move out of town next week. In anticipation of that child's departure, she had enrolled another 2-year-old, but the parents needed the child to begin attending right away. The attendance of the two children overlapped by one week, putting nine children in the same room. Ms. Baker said that by next week, there will be only eight children in each 2-year-old room, and she will be in compliance with § 3.13.

**Meals and nutrition.** The inspector observed that as children entered the snack room, milk was available to be picked up. There was no supervision of the food area. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.37. Child "A" is allergic to dairy products and should not have milk. The restriction is on the child's enrollment form, but teacher Kane said that she was unaware of any dietary restrictions for Child "A." Ms. Baker said that the teacher knew but must have forgotten on a busy morning.

Signed: 

Tiffany Hall, FDCF Child Care Center Inspector

**COPY OF NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY REPORT GIVEN TO OWNER/OPERATOR**

## Email Correspondence Regarding Little Tots Child Care Center

**From:** Jacob Robbins <jsdad@gmail.com>  
**To:** Carla Ortiz <FDCFlicense@Franklin.gov>  
**Cc:** Ashley Baker  
**Subject:** Don't close Little Tots Child Care Center  
**Date:** February 24, 2019, 1:15 pm

I just learned that Little Tots Child Care Center is going to close because you are revoking its license. I have talked with over a dozen parents who are upset. We do not know where to send our kids. My wife commutes to work in an office downtown, and I am a mechanic at the truck depot. The way our hours work out, we need Little Tots because it is the only child care center that meets our schedules. Plus, it is affordable.

I know families that used to rely on relatives to care for their children but were able to send them to Little Tots once Ms. Baker offered discounted rates for those who qualify. Little Tots is a better place for the children than relying on relatives who get sick or just have their own lives to live. It has a good program for the children. My kids love it there. One of my kids was really shy and hesitant to play with other kids but has overcome all that since he started attending Little Tots.

If Little Tots closes, my wife will have to quit her job. That would be bad because her job has the better health benefits. Plus, we need the money she earns to pay for the kids—their dentists' bills, their shoes, clothes, school expenses, extracurricular activities—and we save a bit for emergencies. I heard the same thing from several parents, and I promised them I would write and ask you to reconsider closing this center which we badly need.

I expect the government to care about our children. This is the only low-income child care center within 15 miles of our home. You should be advocating for us, not trying to close down such a wonderful day care.

I am going to get a petition for parents to sign to protest the closing of Little Tots, but I wanted to contact you right away.

Thank you,  
Jacob Robbins

*February 2019*  
*MPT-1 Library*

*State of Franklin Department of Children and Families v.*  
*Little Tots Child Care Center*

**Excerpts from the  
FRANKLIN CHILD CARE CENTER ACT**

**§ 1. Findings and legislative purpose.** The legislature of the State of Franklin finds the following:

(a) It is the policy of the State of Franklin to ensure the safety and well-being of preschool-age children of the State of Franklin through the establishment of minimum standards for child care centers.

(b) There is a need for affordable and safe child care centers for the care of preschool-age children whose parents are employed.

(c) There is a need for affordable and safe child care centers for low-income parents in underserved and economically depressed communities.

(d) By providing for affordable and safe child care centers, the State of Franklin encourages employment of parents who, without these child care centers, could not be employed.

\* \* \*

**§ 3. Licensing of child care centers.**

(a) No person may operate any facility as a child care center without a license issued by the Department of Children and Families upon meeting the standards established for such licensing.

(b) The Director of the Department shall establish licensing standards relating to child care centers. The Director shall inspect each licensed facility at least once each year to determine that the facility is in compliance with the standards of the Department.

...

(f) If the operator of a child care center is in noncompliance with those standards deemed critical, the Director may, after notice, impose penalties including but not limited to a civil fine of at least \$500 but not more than \$10,000, or revocation of the license of the operator.

**Excerpts from Franklin Administrative Code  
Chapter 34. Child Care Centers**

**§ 3.01 General**

The Department of Children and Families has determined that the standards listed in this Section apply to child care centers. Because of the actual or potential harm to children, noncompliance with the following regulations will be determined to be critical violations: Enrollment Procedures, Staff Qualifications, Staffing, Program, Structure and Safety, Meals and Nutrition, and Health.

\* \* \*

**§ 3.06 Enrollment procedures**

...

(b) A written enrollment application with the signatures of the enrolling parents shall be on file for each child. The application shall contain the following information:

...

(8) Name, address, and telephone number of all persons authorized to pick up the child, which includes both

- (i) a primary list of persons authorized to pick up the child regularly and
- (ii) a contingency list of persons authorized to pick up the child occasionally, including conditions, if any, for releasing the child to such persons.

\* \* \*

**§ 3.12 Staff qualifications**

(a) Each child care center shall subject all persons who work with children to criminal background checks and shall require them to authorize the background checks and to submit to fingerprinting. No person who has been convicted of a felony shall be employed at a child care center.

...

**§ 3.13 Staffing**

...

(d) The group sizes and ratio of staff to children present in any classroom at any one time shall be as follows:

<u>Children's age</u>	<u>Ratio of staff to children</u>
Two years	1 staff member to 8 children
Three years	1 staff member to 10 children
Four years	1 staff member to 10 children
Five years	1 staff member to 20 children

\* \* \*

**§ 3.37 Meals and nutrition**

...

(g) A child requiring a special diet due to medical reasons, allergic reactions, or religious beliefs shall be provided with meals and snacks according to the written instructions of the child's parents or legal guardian.

**Lang v. Lone Pine School District**  
Franklin Court of Appeal (2016)

Blake and Olivia Lang, parents of Michael, age seven, sued the Lone Pine School District (District) for violating Michael's rights as a child with disabilities and sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The trial court conducted a hearing on the Langs' motion for a preliminary injunction to allow Michael to attend school with a service animal, and granted that motion. The trial court stayed the effective date of the order three weeks to permit the District time to prepare for the presence of the service animal. The District filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's grant of the preliminary injunction. This action was brought under the Franklin Education Act. The parties did not raise, nor do we address, the question whether the plaintiffs also have a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

We review the trial court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard and affirm.

**Background**

At the hearing, Blake and Olivia testified that during kindergarten and first grade at Lone Pine Elementary School, Michael received various accommodations to address his learning disability, but he still struggled. Last winter, the Langs found a service dog program for children with disabilities. In late spring, Sandy, a service dog, went home with the Langs, after which the Langs noticed a significant improvement in Michael's ability to focus and remain attentive to tasks. In June, an educational specialist recommended that the service dog should accompany Michael to school. The Langs then asked the District to permit Michael to attend school with the service animal.

Cody Black, the educational specialist, testified that he observed Michael with Sandy and found that Sandy provides comfort to Michael and eases his anxieties. This permits Michael to better focus on tasks before him. Black offered the opinion that Michael would perform better in school if Sandy were with him. Specifically, when Michael is accompanied by Sandy, his behavior and social skills improve and he is therefore less likely to be disruptive. Black also testified that service animals provide a similar benefit to disabled students at all levels of education throughout the state, as well as a positive educational lesson for all students.



MacKenzie Downs, principal of Lone Pine Elementary School, testified that the District denied the Langs' request because (1) a district-wide policy prohibits animals in school buildings other than service animals for those with vision impairments, (2) the teachers and staff at Lone Pine are not trained to handle the dog, and (3) there are children at the school who are allergic to dogs. Downs agreed that Michael needs an accommodation and said that she stands ready to support Michael with other methods of assistance. Joe Ramirez, Michael's first-grade teacher, testified that Michael has improved over the course of the past school year despite not having a service animal with him at school. He also testified that the District has purchased several new computers designed for children with learning disabilities. He offered the opinion that using the new computers would help Michael continue to improve, and he saw no need for the service animal to be at school. He confirmed that he and his fellow teachers have received no training in handling service animals.

### **Preliminary Injunction Standard**

Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and is disfavored by the courts, but this relief may be granted in appropriate cases to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must meet this four-factor test: (1) that the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the benefits of granting the injunction outweigh the possible hardships to the party opposing the injunction, and (4) that the issuance of a preliminary injunction serves the public interest.

#### **(1) Likelihood of success on the merits**

First, as to the likelihood of success on the merits, the moving party need not meet the standard of proof required at trial on the merits but must raise a fair question regarding the existence of the claimed right and the relief he will be entitled to if successful at trial on the complaint for permanent relief. A party seeking preliminary relief need only demonstrate that his chances to succeed on at least one of his claims are better than negligible. *Smith v. Pratt* (Fr. Ct. App. 2001). As the court ruled, if the movant shows that his chance of succeeding on his claim for relief is better than a mere possibility, the court should grant the motion for preliminary relief.

The trial court found that there was no dispute that Michael is a child with a disability and requires an accommodation. The trial court found that while there was a dispute as to the type of

accommodation needed and whether the service animal is a proper or necessary accommodation, this was an issue to be decided when the matter is tried on the merits. In the meantime, the Langs have established that the service animal may well be the sort of accommodation needed. Hence, the Langs have shown a fair question regarding the rights of their son and the likelihood of receiving a remedy at trial.

(2) Irreparable harm

An alleged harm or injury is irreparable when the injured party cannot be adequately compensated by damages or when damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. In other words, if the moving party, the Langs, could be compensated through damages for the wrong suffered, they would not have suffered an irreparable injury. The alleged harm here is the harm to Michael of continuing to attend school without the accommodation that may be most helpful to him. While the trial court could award damages to the Langs after a trial on the merits, here it found that no amount of monetary damages could substitute for providing Michael the education he needs.

(3) Balance of benefits and hardships

The court must weigh the benefits of granting the injunction against the possible hardships to the party opposing the injunction. Put another way, the court must determine whether greater injury would result from refusing to grant the relief sought than from granting it. The District argues that the trial court failed to properly consider the costs of permitting the animal to accompany Michael.

The trial court acknowledged that the District would suffer hardships if the injunction were granted. The District's policy currently allows service animals for those with vision impairments but not for those with learning disabilities like Michael's. To permit the animal to accompany Michael, the District must expand its policy, prepare its staff for the presence of the animal, educate parents, and determine how to accommodate children with dog allergies. The trial court found that these steps would cost the District time and money—costs that may be substantial. The trial court weighed the harms cited by the District against those of Michael's loss of an accommodation that will help him overcome his learning disability. Michael is in second grade and has already experienced two years of schooling that has been stressful for him. The sooner Michael's needs are met, the better for him, the trial court concluded, especially given that Michael is in an early

formative period. In sum, the trial court weighed the hardships and found that the balance of harms favored the Langs.

(4) Public interest

Fourth, the trial court must consider whether issuance of the preliminary injunction serves the public interest. This criterion cuts both ways on the facts of this case. On the one hand, the District correctly notes that its need to conserve resources and to assure the well-being of all its students serves the public interest. On the other hand, the Langs are also correct that the injunction will serve the statutory purposes of the laws protecting disabled children by permitting the use of service animals in schools. Additionally, the presence of the service animal in Michael's classroom provides important educational lessons for his classmates and for children throughout the school. These children will learn about the important role of service animals in assisting persons with disabilities. The trial court did not err in concluding that issuance of the injunction served the public interest.

The District also argues that the injunction imposes a continuing duty of supervision on the court, which would be an improper use of judicial resources. "Courts should be reluctant to issue injunctions that transform the court into an ad hoc regulatory agency to supervise the activities of the parties." *Franklin Env't'l Prot. Agency v. Bronson Mfg., Inc.* (Fr. Ct. App. 1999). However, the District overstates the difficulty of enforcement. The trial court ordered the District to permit Michael to attend school with the animal. Compliance with this order is simple. If the District admits Michael with the service animal, it will be in compliance with the injunction. If the District refuses to admit Michael with the service animal, it will be in violation of the injunction.

The trial court issued a preliminary injunction effective until trial on the merits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.

# *February 2019*

## *MPT-1 Point Sheet*

*State of Franklin Department of Children and Families v.  
Little Tots Child Care Center*

This February 2019 MPT point sheet was provided to bar examiners to assist in grading the examination. It addresses the factual and legal points encompassed within the MPT. While it is illustrative of the discussions that might have appeared in excellent responses constructed by examinees, it is more detailed than examinee responses were expected to be.

## **FDCF v. Little Tots Child Care Center**

### **DRAFTERS' POINT SHEET**

In this performance test, examinees are to draft a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking to restrain the Franklin Department of Children and Families (FDCF) from revoking the license of Ashley Baker to operate the Little Tots Child Care Center. Baker became the owner and operator of Little Tots eight months ago. Upon an initial inspection after she became the owner, FDCF found several violations it deemed critical. FDCF then inspected Little Tots every 90 days and continued to find violations. After three failed inspections, the director issued a Notice of Revocation of the license to operate the center, which will take effect in seven days.

Baker believes that if given a few more weeks, she will be in compliance with all the standards. Each FDCF inspection report shows improved compliance. Baker has been challenged to meet the standards while making several changes to the operation of the center since becoming owner. She obtained a government grant that allows her to offer reduced fees to qualifying parents, and she expanded the center's enrollment. She is meeting a community need. She wants to challenge the license revocation.

The supervising attorney has filed the complaint for preliminary and permanent relief and the motion for preliminary injunction. Examinees' task is to draft a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The supervising attorney expects to call as witnesses to testify at the motion hearing Ms. Baker and Jacob Robbins, a parent who has emailed FDCF in support of the center.

The File consists of the memorandum from the supervising attorney, the office guidelines for drafting persuasive briefs, a statement from Ms. Baker, the Notice of Revocation, the FDCF inspection reports, and the email from Jacob Robbins. The Library contains excerpts from the Franklin Child Care Center Act, FDCF regulations implementing the Act, and a Franklin case outlining the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

The following discussion covers all the points the drafters intended to raise in the problem.

## **I. FORMAT AND OVERVIEW**

Examinees are directed to prepare a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction to restrain FDCF from revoking Baker's license to operate Little Tots. They are to draft the memorandum in accordance with the firm's guidelines. There may not be an opportunity to file a rebuttal memorandum, thus examinees should anticipate and address any arguments FDCF may make. Because the courts require that judges make specific findings of fact when granting or denying motions for preliminary injunction, examinees are directed to detail all the evidence available in support of the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

The body of each argument should analyze applicable legal authority and persuasively argue how both the facts and the law support the client's position. Supporting authority should be emphasized, but contrary authority should generally be cited and explained or distinguished. Examinees are directed not to reserve arguments for reply briefing and to be mindful that courts are not persuaded by exaggerated or unsupported arguments.

The firm's guidelines direct examinees to break the arguments into their major components and write carefully crafted subject headings that illustrate the arguments they cover. The headings should effectively summarize the reasons the tribunal should take the position being advocated.

In their argument, examinees should set out the four requirements for a preliminary injunction and show how the evidence provided will meet those requirements. They should also address the general purpose of a preliminary injunction.

## **II. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW**

The case of *Lang v. Lone Pine School District* explains that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is disfavored by the courts. This relief will be granted, however, in appropriate cases to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. The party seeking such a remedy must present evidence that meets the four requirements for a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a balancing of the hardship to the opposing party if the relief is granted and the harm to the movant if it is not, and a consideration of whether issuance of the preliminary injunction serves the public interest. Franklin case law requires courts issuing preliminary injunctions to specify the evidence considered in issuing the injunction.

The Franklin Child Care Center Act (FCCCA) requires that anyone operating a child care center be licensed. FCCCA § 3(a). The Act requires the director of FDCF to establish rules relating

to the operation of child care centers and to inspect the centers at least annually. *Id.* § 3(b). The director is empowered to impose fines or revoke the license of a center that, after warning, continues to be in noncompliance with standards deemed critical. *Id.* § 3(f).

FDCF has promulgated rules for the operation of child care centers in the Franklin Administrative Code. Violations of certain specified standards are deemed critical. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.01.

### **III. FACTS**

Eight months ago, Ashley Baker became the owner and operator of the Little Tots Child Care Center, which serves working-class parents by having early and late hours. She obtained a government grant to subsidize the cost of the center so that she could offer low-fee care for working parents. Little Tots is the only center in the neighborhood that has expanded hours and offers low-fee care. Since Baker began running Little Tots, the State University Early Learning Center has sent its students there to observe its program. At the time of the initial inspection, Little Tots had a maximum allowable enrollment of 96 children. There are two rooms for each age level: 2-year-old children, 3-year-old children, 4-year-old children, and 5-year-old children. It had 19 employees.

After Baker assumed ownership, FDCF inspected the center and observed various violations (i.e., “noncompliance with critical standards”). Because of these deficiencies, the center was inspected every 90 days to the present. The violations of those standards deemed critical by FDCF are failure to complete background checks on some employees, failure to have records of those individuals authorized to pick up children from the center, inadequate staffing, and a failure to adequately supervise the dietary offerings. After three inspections with critical violations, the FDCF director revoked Baker’s license to operate the center.

Baker maintains that a review of the inspection reports shows that she has made steady improvement in complying with the standards. If given a few more weeks, she believes that she will be in complete compliance. Operating Little Tots provides Baker’s sole income and means of repaying the loans she incurred to purchase it. A parent, Jacob Robbins, has emailed FDCF and described the hardships to parents that will follow if the center is closed.

## IV. Argument

### A. General argument in support of preliminary injunction

Examinees should argue the following points in the memorandum:

- A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is disfavored by the courts, but this relief may be granted in appropriate cases to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits. *Lang*.
  - The purpose of a hearing on the motion for preliminary relief is not to decide the case on the merits. *Id.*
- In issuing an injunction, a court should be careful that it does not become a supervising agency, overseeing the actions of the object of the injunction. *Franklin Env't'l. Prot. Agency v. Bronson Mfg., Inc.* (Fr. Ct. App. 1999), cited in *Lang*.
  - Issuance of a preliminary injunction here will avoid making the court a supervisory agency. The court can simply restrain FDCF from revoking Baker's license until the trial on the merits, set for 90 days from now. The court need not further involve itself in the regulation or operation of the center.
- In granting or denying a motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court must describe the evidence on which it relied in making its decision.
- Granting the injunction will preserve the status quo, allowing Baker to continue operating the center with no disruption of service, pending a trial on the merits.

### B. Requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction

Examinees should list the four requirements and describe how the evidence meets each of them: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm to the moving party if the relief is not granted, (3) weighing of the hardship to the opposing party if relief is granted against the irreparable harm to the moving party if the relief is not granted, and (4) a consideration of whether issuance of the preliminary injunction serves the public interest. *Lang*.

#### 1. Baker is likely to succeed on the merits.

Because Baker Has Shown Continued Improvement toward Complete Compliance with the Standards and Because FDCF Has Permitted Her to Continue to Operate despite Prior Deficiencies, She Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits.



The moving party need not meet the standard of proof required at trial on the merits but must raise a fair question regarding the existence of the claimed right and the relief he or she will be entitled to if successful at trial on the complaint for permanent relief. *Lang*. The following facts support an argument that granting the injunction is appropriate:

- Baker is licensed to operate the Little Tots Child Care Center. FCCCA § 3(a).
- Although Baker has been warned of deficiencies, she has shown steady improvement since the inspections began. Baker has improved from having incomplete forms on 37 children to now having only 5 incomplete forms.
- Baker has completed background checks on all but 2 of the 19 staff members. The failure to conduct a background check on Teacher Anders pre-dates Baker's ownership of the center.
- The center has been able to expand its enrollment, thus serving even more children.
- The over-enrollment in the one 2-year-old room will be alleviated in one week.
- No actual harm has occurred to any child.
- The child care program at Little Tots is so good that the State University Early Learning Center sends students to Little Tots to observe. One parent will testify to how his child improved while attending the center.
- The Act envisions time for improvements when it requires that notice be given to an owner before a revocation. FCCCA § 3(f).
- The Act does not require revocation. It also provides for fines as an enforcement tool. While Baker has no desire to be fined, she may argue that fining her and allowing her to continue to operate and to continue to improve meets the Act's requirements. *Id.*
- Permitting Little Tots to continue to operate pending the hearing on the merits maintains the status quo.

Examinees should anticipate that FDCF will argue that each of the three inspections revealed critical violations, including incomplete enrollment forms, failure to complete background checks on employees, inadequate staffing of the center, and a failure to ensure compliance with one child's health needs (Child A's dairy allergy).

Examinees should rebut FDCF's arguments by arguing that the standard for a preliminary injunction is not success on the merits, but *likelihood* of success, defined as raising a fair question regarding the claimed right. *See Lang*. The movant need not prove her case now; that will come at

trial. At this stage, examinees should argue that Baker has raised a fair question by showing continual improvement, the likelihood of total compliance if given a few more weeks, and the availability of penalties short of license revocation (e.g., a fine). They may also argue that FDCF has permitted the center to continue operating for the past seven months, despite some deficiencies. This implies that the cited deficiencies are not that critical or serious.

2. Baker will suffer irreparable harms if the injunction is not granted.

If Her License Is Revoked, Baker Will Lose the Ability to Operate the Child Care Center, Lose the Grant that Allows Her to Serve Low-Income Parents, and Suffer Damage to Her Reputation, All of Which Are Irreparable Harms.

An alleged harm or injury is irreparable when the injured party cannot be adequately compensated by damages or when damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. In other words, if the moving party can be compensated for the wrong suffered through damages, the movant has not suffered an irreparable injury. *Lang*. Examinees should argue that the following facts demonstrate that Baker will suffer irreparable harm:

- If Baker loses the license to operate Little Tots, she will lose her source of income and her ability to repay her loans.
- If she is forced to close, she will likely lose the government grant and, if later relicensed, may not be able to offer the same services she does now. It is likely that if she loses the grant, she will be unable to offer reduced fees to low-income clients.
- If the center closes, it is likely that Baker will lose clients; they will, of necessity, find another center or be forced to give up their jobs because of the unavailability of reliable child care at Little Tots. Even if she can re-open later, those clients may not return.
- Loss of the grant and the clients it attracts is not measurable by a pecuniary standard.
- Even if Baker is able to come into compliance and get relicensed, there will be damage to her reputation, which cannot be easily measured by any certain pecuniary standard.

Examinees should anticipate that FDCF will argue that the loss of income due to closure is calculable and therefore any harm can be adequately compensated by monetary damages. In *Lang*, however, the court allowed that even if damages could be awarded later, they would not compensate for the harm to the child's education. Here, examinees should respond that the loss to Baker of her reputation is very hard to measure, if it can be measured at all. Should she be able to obtain a new license and re-open, it is more than likely that she will have lost clients, due to the

loss of the grant and/or loss of her reputation, or due to parents' need to find another child care center in the meantime.

### 3. Balance of benefits and hardships

The Hardship to the Public from Permitting the Center to Continue to Operate Is Outweighed by the Harm to Baker of Losing the License and to the Parents Who Will Have No Place to Care for Their Children.

The court must weigh the benefits of granting the injunction against the possible hardships to the opposing party. Put another way, the court must determine whether greater injury would result from refusing to grant the relief sought than from granting it. Examinees should argue that the benefits to Baker and others of granting the injunction (and allowing the center to stay open) are greater than the potential hardships if the injunction is not granted and Little Tots is closed:

- If the injunction is granted, there are hardships to the public, to the children whom the Act is designed to protect, and to their parents as well. Examinees will need to identify these hardships by extrapolating from several provisions of the Fr. Admin. Code. These include the following:
  - Danger of children being kidnapped or picked up by an estranged parent or relative who is prohibited from being with the child because of incomplete enrollment forms. 34 Fr. Admin. Code § 3.06(b)(8).
  - Danger of children being harmed due to inadequate staffing. *Id.* § 3.13(d).
  - Danger of children being harmed by a staff person with a violent history or a history of sexual abuse because of failure to conduct background checks on staff. *Id.* § 3.12(a).
  - Danger that a child will become ill or even die due to failure to ensure that dietary restrictions are observed and that the staff members know and follow these procedures. *Id.* § 3.37(g).
- In addition, if Little Tots is allowed to remain open during this time, it sends a message to other child care center operators that they can violate critical FDCF standards without repercussions.
- There is no requirement that FDCF wait until actual harm has occurred to revoke a child care center's license.
- On the other hand, if the injunction is not granted, Baker will suffer irreparable harm as noted above. Additionally, if the injunction is not granted and the license is revoked,

- 19 employees will lose their jobs;
- parents of all enrolled children will have to find alternative child care or will have to cease employment; and
- all enrolled children are likely to receive inferior care.

Examinees should expect FDCF to stress the risks to the children and the public as listed above and to argue that these hardships outweigh the benefits of granting the injunction and keeping the child care center open. In response, examinees should concede that there are hardships that will be suffered by the public but should rely on *Lang* to argue that the grant of an injunction does not require assurance that there will be no hardships, only that any hardships be outweighed by the harm if the relief is not granted.

In *Lang*, the court recognized that the school district would be harmed but balanced those harms against the harm to the child if he could not attend school with his service dog. Likewise, examinees should argue that the benefits of granting the injunction outweigh the harms if it is not granted. If the injunction is not granted, the center will close and parents will be without this resource for their children. Although Little Tots is not in perfect compliance with FDCF standards, it is showing continual improvement in meeting those standards. Given that the deficiencies are ones that FDCF permitted to continue after prior inspections, the deficiencies must not be so dangerous as to outweigh the benefits of keeping Little Tots open.

#### 4. Public interest

Granting the Injunction to Restrain FDCF from Revoking Little Tots’s License Serves the Public Interest because Low-Income Parents Will Continue to Have a Place to Care for Their Children While They Work.

With respect to the fourth requirement for obtaining injunctive relief, examinees should argue that issuance of the preliminary injunction serves the public interest:

- The Franklin legislature found that there was a need for affordable and safe child care centers for the care of preschool-age children, especially in underserved and economically depressed communities. Fr. Child Care Center Act § 1.
- Little Tots Child Care Center fulfills the needs identified by the legislature by providing low-cost care for the preschool-age children of working parents. It is the only low-cost center in the area. Granting the injunction will permit Little Tots to continue to meet this stated public purpose.

- Little Tots serves parents whose work schedules begin early or end late and who are low-income workers.
- Unless the injunction is granted and Little Tots stays open, the children are likely to be left with relatives who may not have the resources to care for them. The children are likely to be safer at Little Tots than elsewhere. Keeping the center open fulfills the legislative purpose of ensuring the safety and well-being of preschool-age children whose parents work.
- Some parents may be forced to quit working to stay home with their children. That option is likely unaffordable for these working-class parents. This will lead to more unemployment and hardship.
- None of the inspections revealed violations related to the center's program, another critical standard, so the court can infer that the children are being well cared for. In fact, the program of Little Tots is of such good quality that the State University Early Learning Center has sent its students to observe it.

Examinees should acknowledge that the legislature authorized the FDCF director to establish standards and authorized the director to revoke the license of a child care center that fails to meet the critical standards. License revocation is the mechanism that the legislature provided to ensure the safety and well-being of the children. Examinees should anticipate that FDCF will argue that, given the deficiencies at Little Tots over seven months, the children's safety is at risk.

In response, examinees should argue that FDCF, by providing time for improvements, has already conceded that the risk of harm did not require immediate revocation. Moreover, allowing for improvements is important and required under the Act. Baker has shown continued improvement and, with a few more weeks, is likely to meet all the standards. The harms to the community in closing Little Tots now would be great and must be balanced against completing the last few steps to be in total compliance with the FDCF standards.

*February 2019*  
*MPT-2 File*

*In re Remick*

**Daniels & Martin LLP**  
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**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Examinee  
**FROM:** Susan Daniels  
**DATE:** February 26, 2019  
**RE:** Andrew Remick matter

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Our client, Andrew Remick, was injured when his car stalled on a roadway and was struck by another vehicle. At the time of the accident, Remick was in the backseat of his car with a twisted ankle while a motorist, Larry Dunbar, attempted to jump-start the car with his truck's battery. Another motorist, Marsha Gibson, drove around a bend in the road, was unable to stop in time, and struck Remick's stalled car from behind. As a result of the collision, Remick was seriously injured and his car sustained significant damage.

Remick wants to know if he has any legal recourse. We talked about suing Marsha Gibson, and I suggested that there may also be a claim against Larry Dunbar. Remick told me that he thought the collision could have been avoided if Dunbar had either moved Remick's stalled car to the side of the road, set out emergency flares, or turned on the hazard lights on his truck.

Please draft a memorandum to me analyzing and evaluating whether Remick has a viable negligence claim against Dunbar. In addressing the element of duty, discuss the legal theories under sections 42 and 44 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Do not address either Gibson's liability or any defenses based on Remick's conduct.

Do not include a separate statement of facts, but be sure to incorporate the relevant facts, analyze the applicable legal authorities, and explain how the facts and law affect your analysis. I will ask another associate to assess the claim against Gibson.

**Transcript of Interview of Andrew Remick  
February 19, 2019**

**Attorney:** Andrew, it's good to meet you. How are you doing?

**Remick:** I'm feeling better than I was a month ago, but I'm still on the mend.

**Attorney:** Why don't you tell me what happened.

**Remick:** Well, on January 20, I was driving my car on Highway 290 down by the coast. It's a two-lane road with small towns scattered here and there.

**Attorney:** Yes, I've been down that way before, and I recall that it's a pretty isolated stretch. How did the accident occur?

**Remick:** I was on my way back to Franklin City from a weekend trip. It was about 4:30 p.m., and all of a sudden my car stopped working. It just powered off and the dashboard display stopped working. I tried to start the car, but the engine wouldn't even turn over. I tried to turn on the hazard lights, but they didn't work either.

**Attorney:** Were you able to pull over to the side of the road?

**Remick:** No, the engine died while I was driving; I didn't have time to pull off the road.

**Attorney:** What did you do next?

**Remick:** First, I tried to use my cell phone to call for help, but I couldn't get a signal. I tried to push the car to the shoulder of the road. Since it's a stick shift, it can be moved, but when I tried to move it, I slipped and fell, badly twisting my right ankle. I was in excruciating pain and I could barely put any weight on it. I decided to get into the backseat to keep my ankle elevated and wait for somebody to drive by.

**Attorney:** And did that happen?

**Remick:** Yes, about 45 minutes later, a man named Larry Dunbar pulled up on the shoulder of the road next to my car, got out of his truck, and asked me if I needed help. I explained what had happened. Larry said that he was a mechanic and offered to help me.

**Attorney:** What did he do?

**Remick:** He went back to his truck, grabbed a toolbox, and began poking around under the hood of my car. I'm not very knowledgeable about cars, but I remember him mentioning that he thought my car might have a bad alternator, which is part of the



car's electrical system, so he was going to try to jump-start the car to see if the alternator was working.

**Attorney:** Where were you when all this was happening?

**Remick:** I was still sitting in the back of my car with my right foot elevated on the backseat. By this time, it was starting to get dark. My ankle had swelled up, and I was in a lot of pain. I told Larry I was worried about the fact that it was getting dark and my car was still parked on the road. I asked him if he could push the car off the road. He told me not to worry because he thought he could get the car started pretty quickly. I told him that I had emergency flares in the trunk; he said not to worry.

**Attorney:** Was he able to jump-start your car?

**Remick:** I never found out. Right after he attached the jumper cables, I heard another car coming around the bend behind my car and then I heard the screech of tires as the driver hit the brakes, but she couldn't stop in time. She hit my car, with me still in the backseat! The impact was so hard that it slammed me into the back of the driver's seat. I blacked out, and when I woke up, I was in the hospital.

**Attorney:** I can see a brace on your left shoulder, and your left arm is in a cast and a sling. Is that from the accident?

**Remick:** Yes, the impact of the collision dislocated my shoulder, broke my arm, and gave me a minor concussion. The ankle I initially twisted when I fell is nearly healed, and my doctor doesn't anticipate any long-term complications from the concussion. But the orthopedist thinks I will probably need surgery to repair the damage to my shoulder, and my broken arm will need to heal for at least another three to four weeks before the cast can be removed. I've been told that I'll have to undergo physical therapy for several months to regain full function in my left arm and shoulder. I'm really worried about my shoulder and my arm. I own a small landscaping business, and most of my work is very physical. Without full use of my shoulder and arm, I can't work.

**Attorney:** What about Larry Dunbar and the other driver, Marsha Gibson?

**Remick:** I don't know. I've never met or spoken to the other driver, Marsha Gibson, and I haven't seen or spoken to Larry Dunbar since the accident.

**Attorney:** What about your car? How badly was it damaged?

**Remick:** It turns out that my car stalled because of a bad alternator, which would have cost a few hundred dollars to fix. But now it's going to cost at least \$4,500 to repair the damage caused by the collision.

**Attorney:** Was a police report generated for the accident?

**Remick:** I don't know. In the month since the accident, I've been focused on my recovery and trying to keep my landscaping business afloat. I think that the accident could have been avoided if Larry had taken the time to move my car to the side of the road or if he had at least turned on the hazard lights on his truck—you know, the "flashers"—or used my emergency flares. If he had done any of those things, I doubt that the other driver would have hit my car, and I would be nursing a sore ankle instead of facing shoulder surgery and months of rehabilitation.

**Attorney:** You may have a case against Larry Dunbar as well as against the driver who hit you. I'll get back to you as soon as we have completed our initial assessment of your case.

**Remick:** Thanks. I really appreciate your assistance.

**Daniels & Martin LLP**  
Attorneys at Law  
3200 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 270  
Franklin City, Franklin 33075

**MEMORANDUM TO FILE**

**FROM:** Peter Nelson, Private Investigator  
**DATE:** February 22, 2019  
**RE:** Andrew Remick matter

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As requested, I have obtained a copy of the police report for the car accident that occurred on January 20, 2019. I also interviewed Marsha Gibson, the driver of the SUV that rear-ended Remick's stalled car, and gathered some initial background information about Larry Dunbar. Below is a summary of my findings.

Police Report:

- A two-car collision involving Remick's four-door passenger car and Gibson's SUV occurred at approximately 6:00 p.m. on January 20, 2019, on a relatively remote, two-lane stretch of Highway 290 between the towns of Castlerock and Highwater.
- At the time of the collision, Remick's car was stalled on the northbound lane of the highway, approximately 75 feet beyond a bend in the road.
- Remick was sitting in the backseat of his car at the time of impact.
- Dunbar's truck was parked on the shoulder of the northbound lane next to Remick's car.
- The hoods of Remick's car and Dunbar's truck were up, and Dunbar was in the process of jump-starting Remick's car battery.
- Gibson was driving northbound on Highway 290 at approximately 50 mph (the speed limit is 55 mph).
- Skid marks measured at the scene of the accident indicate that Gibson immediately applied the brakes on her vehicle but was unable to avoid hitting Remick's car. Her estimated speed at impact was 25 mph.
- The force of the collision caused Remick to slam into the driver's seat in front of him, as a result of which he suffered a concussion, a dislocated shoulder, and a broken arm. He was transported by ambulance to Castlerock Hospital for medical treatment.

- Neither Gibson nor Dunbar was injured by the collision.
- No persons were cited or ticketed for the accident, although the responding police officer noted that the accident occurred at dusk and that neither Remick's car nor Dunbar's truck had its hazard lights turned on.

Marsha Gibson's Statement to Police:

- Gibson claims that she was driving under the speed limit at the time of the collision.
- Gibson did not see Remick's unlit car until she was about 40 feet away from it because it was getting dark outside and Remick's car was parked just beyond a bend in the road.
- Gibson estimates that she was driving at about 25 to 30 mph when she collided with Remick's car.
- Gibson was not injured in the accident.

Larry Dunbar Background Information:

- Dunbar is 35 years old and currently works in cable TV sales.
- Dunbar is a former automotive mechanic, having spent three years working for Franklin City Automotive from 2012 to 2015.

*February 2019*  
*MPT-2 Library*

*In re Remick*

## Excerpts from Restatement (Third) of Torts (2012)

### § 42 Duty Based on Undertaking

An actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows or should know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the other in conducting the undertaking if:

(a) the failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm beyond that which existed without the undertaking, or

(b) the person to whom the services are rendered . . . relies on the actor's exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.

#### Comment:

\* \* \*

*c. . . . [A]ffirmative duty based on undertaking . . .* The duty provided in this Section is one of reasonable care. It may be breached either by an act of commission (misfeasance) or by an act of omission (nonfeasance).

*d. Threshold for an undertaking.* An undertaking entails an actor voluntarily rendering a service . . . on behalf of another . . . . The actor's knowledge that the undertaking serves to reduce the risk of harm to another, or of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion, is a prerequisite for an undertaking under this Section.

\* \* \*

### § 44 Duty to Another Based on Taking Charge of the Other

An actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably appears to be:

(1) imperiled; and

(2) helpless or unable to protect himself or herself

has a duty to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor's charge.

#### Comment:

\* \* \*

*c. Distinctive feature of rescuer affirmative duty.* This Section is limited to instances in which an actor takes steps to engage in a rescue by taking charge of another who is imperiled and unable

adequately to protect himself or herself. The duty is limited in scope and duration to the peril to which the other is exposed and requires that the actor voluntarily undertake a rescue and actually take charge of the other.

\* \* \*

*g. Taking charge of one who is helpless.* The rule stated in this Section is applicable whenever a rescuer takes charge of another who is imperiled and incapable of taking adequate care. The rule is equally applicable to one who is rendered helpless by his or her own conduct, including intoxication; by the tortious or innocent conduct of others; or by a force of nature. The rule, however, requires that the rescuer take charge of the helpless individual with the intent of providing assistance in confronting the then-existing peril.

**Weiss v. McCann**  
Franklin Court of Appeal (2015)

Plaintiff David Weiss, individually and in his capacity as guardian for Janet Weiss, appeals the dismissal of his personal injury action against Sue McCann for serious injuries his wife sustained at a party hosted by McCann. The issue on appeal is whether the Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 42 and 44, collectively referred to as the “affirmative duty” or “Good Samaritan” doctrine, should apply to a homeowner. We find that under the specific facts of this case the Good Samaritan doctrine does apply. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the action.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On December 29, 2013, McCann hosted a party at her home in her basement recreation room. Janet Weiss, a neighbor, was among the attendees. Both McCann and Weiss had been drinking alcoholic beverages that evening. When the party ended and everyone had left except Weiss and McCann, Weiss fell, struck her head on the concrete floor, and lost consciousness. McCann revived Weiss and placed her on a couch. The next morning Weiss awoke and walked home, without informing McCann that she was leaving. At 9:30 a.m., McCann called Weiss’s home to see whether Weiss had arrived home safely. McCann spoke to Weiss’s husband, David, who said that Weiss was home and asleep. During the call, McCann did not mention that Weiss had fallen and hit her head. McCann called again at 11:30 a.m. to check on Weiss and for the first time informed David of his wife’s fall and injury. David checked on Weiss and was unable to wake her, so he immediately called 911. An ambulance took Weiss to the hospital, where she had emergency brain surgery for a subdural hematoma. As a result of the injury, she suffered permanent brain damage. David Weiss brought this personal injury action against McCann, alleging that McCann was negligent in caring for Weiss after her fall and injury. McCann moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the trial court granted the motion.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that his complaint properly stated a cause of action in negligence based on the common law “affirmative duty” or “Good Samaritan” doctrine set forth in Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 42 and 44, which has been adopted by the Franklin courts. To determine whether the trial court properly granted McCann’s motion to dismiss, this court must consider as true all of the well-pleaded material facts set forth in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. *Davis v. Humphries* (Franklin Sup. Ct. 1996).



As a preliminary matter, we note that to establish a viable cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff's complaint must allege the following four elements: (1) duty: a legal obligation requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of duty: unreasonable conduct in light of foreseeable risks of harm; (3) causation: a reasonably close causal connection between the actor's conduct and the resulting harm; and (4) damages, including at least one of the following: lost wages, pain and suffering, medical expenses, or property loss or damage. *Fisher v. Brawn* (Franklin Sup. Ct. 1998).

On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that he presented facts establishing a duty under the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 42, which provides, “[a]n actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows or should know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the other in conducting the undertaking if: (a) the failure to exercise [reasonable] care increases the risk of harm beyond that which existed without the undertaking or (b) the person to whom the services are rendered . . . relies on the actor's exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.”

We conclude that the language of § 42 envisions the assistance of a private person, such as McCann, to a person in need of aid. Based on the plain language of the Restatement, we will not, as a matter of law, preclude the application of § 42 to a homeowner such as McCann.

We now consider whether § 44 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts should apply as well. Section 44 provides that “[a]n actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably appears to be: (1) imperiled; and (2) helpless or unable to protect himself or herself has a duty to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor's charge.” Section 44 applies “whenever a rescuer takes charge of another who is imperiled and incapable of taking adequate care,” including “one who is rendered helpless by his or her own conduct, including intoxication.” § 44, comment g. Based on this language, it is clear that § 44 may apply to the homeowner McCann in this case.

The plaintiff's complaint alleges that McCann did not contact Weiss's family or seek medical assistance for Weiss after she fell and then failed to inform the plaintiff of Weiss's fall and injury until nearly noon the next day, at which point the plaintiff was unable to revive his wife. Based on our review of the language of the Restatement and the applicable case law, we cannot, as a matter of law, preclude the application of § 44 to McCann.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to reinstate the complaint.

**Thomas v. Baytown Golf Course**  
Franklin Court of Appeal (2016)

This interlocutory appeal stems from a wrongful death action brought by the surviving family members of Seth Thomas, who was killed in an automobile accident. Defendant Baytown Golf Course (Baytown) petitions for review of the trial court’s order striking Baytown’s notice that another individual, Glenn Parker, who was not named in this lawsuit, was a participating cause of the fatality and hence liable for comparative apportionment of damages under Franklin law. We conclude that Parker could be liable as a nonparty for the fatal accident after Parker assumed the duty of a “Good Samaritan” to use reasonable care for Thomas, but in fact placed Thomas in a worse position by giving his keys back to him and allowing him to drive away.

FACTS

On June 3, 2012, Thomas and Parker played golf and consumed alcoholic beverages at Baytown. Because Thomas appeared intoxicated, a Baytown employee took possession of Thomas’s car keys. Parker then stepped forward and offered to drive Thomas home. With that assurance, and observing Parker’s apparent lack of impairment, the employee gave Thomas’s keys to Parker. Once in the parking lot, Parker returned the keys to Thomas. Thomas left the golf course in his own car and crashed into a tree. He died from his injuries.

The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Baytown alleging that Baytown’s sale of alcohol to Thomas was the cause of the accident. Baytown filed a notice of nonparty at fault, alleging that Parker was at least partially at fault because he volunteered to drive Thomas home and then gave the car keys back to Thomas. The plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to strike Baytown’s notice of nonparty at fault. The trial court granted the motion, and this interlocutory appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Baytown that the trial court erred, and so reverse and remand.

DISCUSSION

Rule 28 of the Franklin Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant can give notice that a person or entity not a party to the action is allegedly wholly or partially at fault for the purpose of determining the respective liability of all actors under Franklin’s comparative negligence laws. The jury is required to consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury, regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the

suit. Once a defendant designates a person as a nonparty at fault by filing the appropriate notice with the trial court, the defendant can offer evidence of the nonparty's negligence and argue that the jury should attribute some or all fault to the nonparty, thereby reducing the defendant's percentage of fault and consequent liability.

The issue, then, is whether Parker's actions contributed to Thomas's death, rendering Parker wholly or partially at fault. To find a person at fault in a negligence action, four elements must be shown: (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. *See Fisher v. Brawn* (Franklin Sup. Ct. 1998). A duty must be recognized by law and must obligate a defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm. *Id.*

Baytown argues that Parker had a duty to Thomas under the Good Samaritan doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 42 and 44. In its docket entry striking Baytown's notice of nonparty at fault, the trial court stated, "Mr. Thomas was not . . . 'helpless' as that term is used in § 44. He was simply too drunk to drive." We disagree. The determination of whether an individual is "imperiled" and "helpless" must be made within the context of each case. A person who is drunk and slumped in a chair at home in front of the television may not be considered imperiled and helpless. However, we reach the opposite conclusion if the same person is put behind the wheel of an automobile and sent down the road. Moreover, comment g to § 44 specifically provides that § 44 applies where a person "is rendered helpless by his or her own conduct, including intoxication."

Although the trial court's order focused on § 44, we find that both sections of the Restatement are applicable to the facts of this case. The major difference between the sections is the requirement of § 44 that the person be in an imperiled, helpless position. Section 42 has no such requirement, but does require either that the actor's actions increased the risk of harm or that the victim relied on the actor. In either event, we believe that the Good Samaritan doctrine applies when an actor, otherwise without any duty to do so, voluntarily takes charge of an intoxicated person who is attempting to drive a vehicle and, because of the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care, changes the other person's position for the worse. The rule applies here because if Parker had not said that he would see that Thomas got home safely, Baytown might have taken steps that would have avoided the accident.

The plaintiffs argue that Parker did not have a duty to Thomas because it was Baytown that first provided Thomas with the alcohol that rendered him too drunk to drive. The plaintiffs contend that the duty of care that Baytown owed to Thomas as a patron in its bar is not one that can be delegated. We agree that Baytown's duty cannot be delegated. Baytown, however, is not trying to delegate its responsibilities to Parker. Rather, Baytown argues, and we agree, that the duties owed by Baytown and Parker are independent of each other.

When Parker took charge of Thomas for reasons of safety, he thereby assumed a duty to use reasonable care. Thomas was too drunk to drive. Baytown's employees had taken charge of Thomas and effectively stopped him from driving. Parker's offer deterred the employees from their efforts to keep Thomas out of his automobile. Rather than use reasonable care to drive Thomas home or make other arrangements, Parker discontinued his assistance and put Thomas in a worse position than he had been in when Baytown's employees had possession of his keys. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Parker's actions contributed to Thomas's death, rendering Parker wholly or partially at fault.

We conclude that the trial court erred in striking Parker as a nonparty at fault and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

**Boxer v. Shaw**  
Franklin Court of Appeal (2017)

Plaintiff Karen Boxer, as personal representative of the estate of Tim Boxer, appeals the dismissal of her wrongful death action against defendant Harry Shaw. Tim Boxer was struck and killed by a truck after exiting Shaw's car on the side of a highway. The trial court granted Shaw's motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

At trial, Shaw testified that he and Boxer were coworkers who often socialized together. On the day of the accident, he and Boxer finished work early, around 3 p.m., and decided to go fishing. Shaw offered to drive because Boxer's car was in the shop. The two men fished for about three hours. They then went to a marina, watched the boats, and played pool until about 10 p.m., at which time they decided to go to a nightclub. They were driving on Highway 101 to the club when they got into a heated argument. Boxer started cursing and demanded that Shaw stop the car. Shaw pulled onto the shoulder of the road, and Boxer exited the car and lit a cigarette. Shaw has stated that he thought Boxer would get back in the car after smoking his cigarette, but Boxer refused to do so. Shaw decided to briefly drive away to allow Boxer to "cool off." Shaw drove one mile down the road and then returned. In the meantime, Boxer attempted to cross the highway and was struck by a truck.

Shaw testified that, although the two men had consumed a few beers while playing pool, Boxer did not appear to have had too much to drink. The toxicology and autopsy reports confirmed that Boxer's blood alcohol level was under the legal limit. It is undisputed that the accident occurred around 10:30 p.m., it was dark with misting rain, there were no lights on the highway, and Boxer was wearing dark clothing. The investigating police officer testified that the shoulder of the highway was "extremely wide" and agreed that there was ample room for a pedestrian to walk there.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for Shaw on the issue of duty. The plaintiff contends that she presented evidence that Boxer was "helpless" and that Shaw had "taken charge of" Boxer after the two men left work to go fishing and thereby had assumed a duty to leave Boxer in no worse a position than when he took charge of him. We must determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Shaw owed no duty of care to Boxer because Boxer was not "helpless" and Shaw did not "take charge of" him.

In reviewing a ruling granting a directed verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. *Ellis v. Dowd* (Franklin Sup. Ct. 1995). In a negligence action, if there is no duty, then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. *Id.*

An affirmative legal duty to act exists only if created by statute, contract, relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance. The common law ordinarily imposes no duty on a person to act; however, where an act is voluntarily undertaken, the actor assumes the duty to use reasonable care. *Id.*

The Restatement (Third) of Torts § 44 provides that an actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably appears to be imperiled and helpless or unable to protect himself or herself has a duty to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor's charge.

Under the Restatement, an intoxicated person is considered helpless. § 44 comment g. However, the undisputed evidence in this case indicates that Boxer was not "helpless." The mere fact that Boxer's car was being repaired did not render him helpless, and his blood alcohol level was below the legal limit. There was testimony from a family member that Boxer was in the midst of a nasty divorce and that he was very upset about the breakup of his marriage. However, the fact that a person may be distraught about a situation does not render that person "helpless" without additional evidence of actual impairment.

Even if we assume that Boxer was "helpless" under the circumstances, to show that Shaw "took charge" of Boxer, the plaintiff would have to show that Shaw through affirmative action assumed an obligation or intended to render services for Boxer's benefit. *See, e.g., Thomas v. Baytown Golf Course* (Franklin Ct. App. 2016) (golfer assumed duty by telling golf course employee who had taken car keys from an intoxicated man that the golfer would drive the man home); *Sargent v. Howard* (Franklin Ct. App. 2013) (driver could be held liable for injuries sustained by ill passenger who was attacked after being left in an unlocked, running vehicle at night while driver used a convenience store restroom).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts do not indicate that Shaw, through affirmative action, assumed an obligation or intended to render services for Boxer's benefit. We disagree with the plaintiff's claim that Shaw "took charge of" Boxer when the two men left work to socialize on the day of the accident, nor did he do so at any point throughout the remainder of the day. Boxer was not legally intoxicated and he was not helpless.

Accordingly, Shaw could not have assumed an obligation to render services for Boxer's benefit. Granted, on the day of the accident, Shaw drove. However, Shaw's driving is not evidence of the assumption of an affirmative obligation by Shaw to take care of Boxer. It is undisputed that both men mutually agreed to go fishing, visit the marina, and head to the nightclub. There is no suggestion that Shaw directed when and where he and Boxer would go, or that he intended to "take charge of" Boxer.

Because the plaintiff presented no evidence from which a jury could find that Boxer was "helpless" or that Shaw "took charge of" him, the trial court correctly concluded that Shaw had no duty to Boxer and properly directed the verdict for Shaw.

Affirmed.

# *February 2019*

## *MPT-2 Point Sheet*

*In re Remick*

This February 2019 MPT point sheet was provided to bar examiners to assist in grading the examination. It addresses the factual and legal points encompassed within the MPT. While it is illustrative of the discussions that might have appeared in excellent responses constructed by examinees, it is more detailed than examinee responses were expected to be.



## **In re Remick**

### **DRAFTERS' POINT SHEET**

In this performance test, the client, Andrew Remick, is considering taking legal action against a motorist, Larry Dunbar, who attempted to help Remick when his car stalled on a highway. Dunbar was jump-starting Remick's car, which was stopped on the road at dusk without its hazard lights on, when another motorist (Marsha Gibson) drove around the bend and rear-ended Remick's car. Remick was in the backseat of his car nursing a sprained ankle when the collision occurred. The force of the collision threw Remick against the back of the driver's seat, and he sustained a concussion, dislocated shoulder, and broken arm. The primary inquiry is whether Dunbar, a "Good Samaritan" who offered to assist Remick, owed Remick an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances to protect Remick and his car from being hit by another motorist. If so, and if Dunbar breached that duty and Remick can also show causation and resulting damage, then Remick can pursue a negligence action against Dunbar.

The File contains the instructional memorandum from the supervising attorney, a transcript of the client interview, and a memorandum from the firm's private investigator. The Library contains excerpts from the Restatement (Third) of Torts and three Franklin cases.

The following discussion covers all the points the drafters intended to raise in the problem.

#### **I. OVERVIEW**

Examinees' task is to draft an objective memorandum analyzing and evaluating whether Remick has a viable negligence claim against Dunbar under the alternatives set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts (also known as the "affirmative duty" or "Good Samaritan" doctrine). In doing so, examinees should discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. No specific formatting guidelines are provided. However, examinees are instructed not to prepare a separate statement of facts but to incorporate the relevant facts, analyze the applicable legal authorities, and explain how the facts and law affect their analysis.

#### **II. LEGAL AUTHORITY**

The following points, which examinees should apply in formulating their analysis, emerge from the Restatement and cases in the Library:

- A cause of action for negligence requires a showing of four elements: (1) duty: a legal obligation requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of duty: unreasonable conduct in light of foreseeable risks of harm; (3) causation: a reasonably close causal connection between the actor’s conduct and the resulting harm; and (4) damages, including at least one of the following: lost wages, pain and suffering, medical expenses, or property loss or damage. *Weiss v. McCann* (Fr. Ct. App. 2015) (citing *Fisher v. Brawn* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 1998)).
- Whether a duty exists is usually, but not always exclusively, a question of law. *Id.*
- In some circumstances, the question of whether a duty arises depends on the existence of particular facts. *See Boxer v. Shaw* (Fr. Ct. App. 2017).
- An affirmative legal duty to act exists only if created by statute, contract, relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance. *Id.*
- The common law ordinarily imposes no duty on a person to act; however, where an act is voluntarily undertaken, the actor assumes the duty to use due care under the Good Samaritan doctrine set forth in Restatement §§ 42 and 44, which is followed in Franklin. *See Thomas v. Baytown Golf Course* (Fr. Ct. App. 2016), *Boxer*, and *Weiss*.
- Restatement § 42 provides that an actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows or should know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to the other is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the other by the actor's failure to exercise due care in the performance of the undertaking or by the other’s reliance upon the undertaking. *See Weiss*.
- Comment c to § 42 provides that the duty is one of reasonable care, and it may be breached either by an act of commission (misfeasance) or by an act of omission (nonfeasance).
- An undertaking occurs when an actor voluntarily renders a service on behalf of another and the actor knows that the undertaking serves to reduce the risk of harm to another, or the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 42, comment d.
- When the underlying facts are in dispute, the question of whether a duty exists must be submitted to the factfinder. *See Boxer*.
- Section 44 imposes an affirmative duty on an actor who takes charge of another who is “imperiled” and “helpless or unable to protect himself or herself” at the time. The major

difference between the two sections is the requirement in § 44 that the other person be in an imperiled, helpless position. *Thomas*.

- Section 44 provides that an actor who, despite no duty to do so, takes charge of another who reasonably appears to be imperiled and helpless or unable to protect himself or herself is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the person by the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care while the other is within the actor's charge.
- Section 44 applies "whenever a rescuer takes charge of another who is imperiled and incapable of taking adequate care." Restatement (Third) of Torts § 44, comment g.
- Section 44 applies equally where one is rendered helpless by his or her own conduct (including intoxication), by the tortious or innocent conduct of others, or by a force of nature. § 44, comment g. The rule, however, requires that the rescuer take charge of the helpless individual with the intent of providing assistance in confronting the then-existing peril.
- The determination of whether an individual is "imperiled" and "helpless" is context-specific. *Thomas*. So, for example, a person who is drunk in a chair at home may not be imperiled and helpless, whereas that same person behind the wheel of a car would be. *Id.*
- Where a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for negligence based on the Good Samaritan doctrine and alleges sufficient facts to raise a factual issue regarding whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care under the circumstances, the court will not, as a matter of law, preclude the application of § 44 to the defendant. *Weiss; Thomas*.
- Conversely, where the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff by assuming an obligation or intending to render services to the plaintiff, as was the case in *Boxer*, the plaintiff's case will fail. *See Boxer*.
- In addition to duty and breach, the remaining two elements of a cause of action for negligence must also be demonstrated—i.e., causation and damages.
- As to the element of causation, the inquiry is whether the defendant's breach of duty is sufficiently causally related to the resulting injury to the plaintiff. *See Weiss*.
- The standard for damages is whether the plaintiff suffered losses such as pain and suffering, loss of wages, or present and future medical expenses. *Id.*

### III. ANALYSIS

Examinees' work product should include a discussion of the facts, although it should not contain a separate statement of facts. The following analysis is organized according to the four required elements for stating a negligence claim, but examinees could organize their analysis so as to address the requirements of the Restatement/Good Samaritan doctrine first, followed by a discussion of the four elements for a negligence claim using the Restatement-based duty.

#### A. Whether Dunbar Owed a Duty of Care to Remick

- The general rule of thumb is that a person owes no duty to assist a person in need, in the absence of a special relationship or special circumstance. *Boxer*.
- However, if a person who owes no duty nonetheless offers to assist another in need, the person is liable to the other for physical harm resulting from the person's failure to exercise reasonable care if the person increases the risk of such harm or the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance on the person. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 42.
- Moreover, if the person "takes charge" of another who is "imperiled" and "helpless," the person also faces liability under Restatement § 44 for bodily harm caused by the person's failure to exercise reasonable care or secure the safety of the other person.
- Because the two Restatement sections involve similar duties, examinees will likely either analyze the applicability of both sections together under their duty/breach analysis, or fully analyze the applicability of § 42 and then focus their analysis of § 44 on the specific imperiled/helplessness feature of that section without repeating the portions of their § 42 analysis that apply equally to § 44. Either approach is fine, as long as examinees demonstrate an understanding of the Good Samaritan doctrine and the applicability of § 44 to situations where the assisted person is helpless.
- The facts in the File (specifically, the client interview transcript) indicate that Dunbar stopped to help Remick, although he was not required to offer assistance, and that he proceeded to troubleshoot and try to fix Remick's stalled car.
- Stopping to help a stranded, incapacitated driver in a remote location is a situation that Dunbar or any reasonable person would understand as helping to reduce the risk of harm to that person. *See* § 42, comment d. Furthermore, because of Remick's incapacitation and Dunbar's experience as a mechanic, it is clear that Remick relied upon Dunbar to assist

him. Thus, Dunbar could be found to have owed a duty to Remick under both prongs (a) and (b) of § 42.

- When Remick expressed concern about the fact that it was getting dark and his car was still stalled on the road, Dunbar failed to take any action to protect the car or Remick, who was inside the car, against the possibility of a collision with a third vehicle.
- In *Weiss* and *Thomas*, the court held that §§ 42 and 44 apply to laypersons such as homeowners and motorists who attempt to assist others who are incapacitated.
- Here, a court would likely conclude that Dunbar assumed a similar duty with regard to Remick.
- A court would also likely conclude that Restatement § 44 applies because Remick was “imperiled” and “helpless,” and Dunbar “took charge” of him.
- The determination whether an individual is “imperiled” and “helpless” must be made within the context of each case, and comment g to § 44 makes clear that § 44 applies regardless of whether a person’s helplessness is self-inflicted (such as was the case in *Weiss* and *Thomas*, where the assisted person had drunk too much) or the result of other causes.
- Here, the context indicates that Remick was indeed “imperiled,” “helpless,” and “unable adequately to protect himself” due to his ankle injury (arguably a self-inflicted incapacitation not unlike the situations in *Weiss* and *Thomas*, although of a different nature—those cases involved mental incapacitation whereas Remick’s situation involves physical incapacitation). Restatement (Third) of Torts § 44, comments c and g.
- Remick’s situation is distinguishable from that of the decedent in the *Boxer* case because in *Boxer*, the decedent was not “helpless” because he had no mental or physical impairment (his blood alcohol level was below the legal limit and his divorce-related stress was not incapacitating).
- The facts further indicate that Dunbar “took charge” of the situation (and Remick) by examining and working on Remick’s car while Remick waited in his car with an ankle injury that made him essentially immobile. *Cf. Boxer* (defendant did not “take charge” of able-bodied decedent simply by offering to drive decedent to mutually agreed-upon social activities).

## **B. Whether Dunbar Breached a Duty of Care Owed to Remick**

- Dunbar can be held liable for attempting to assist Remick but failing to adequately secure and protect Remick or his car against an accident.
- The situation here is not unlike that in *Sargent v. Howard* (Fr. Ct. App. 2013) (cited in *Boxer*), where the court held that a Good Samaritan driver could be held liable for injuries sustained by an ill passenger who was attacked by a stranger after being left at night in an unlocked, running vehicle while the driver used a convenience store restroom.
- Like the plaintiff in *Sargent*, who was left in an unlocked car and vulnerable to attack, Remick was essentially a “sitting duck” for any oncoming car.
- Once Remick accepted Dunbar’s help, Dunbar was obligated to use reasonable care under the circumstances. As an experienced driver, Dunbar should have been aware of the hazard light features on his own truck. As a former mechanic, Dunbar further should have understood the risk of leaving Remick’s disabled and unlit car on the road.
- Reasonable care would have included either moving the car to the side of the road or at least turning Dunbar’s own truck lights or hazard lights on and/or using Remick’s emergency flares, so that approaching motorists would have been able to see Remick’s car and avoid hitting it. Dunbar’s failure to do so constitutes an “act of omission (nonfeasance),” resulting in a breach of duty under § 42. *See* § 42, comment c.
- Similarly, an argument can be made that Dunbar took charge of Remick and his car knowing that Remick was injured and helpless under the circumstances. Dunbar’s failure to move the car to the side of the road or to use the hazard lights on his truck or the emergency flares to make Remick’s car more noticeable to oncoming traffic amounted to a breach of duty under § 44.

## **C. Whether There Is a Reasonably Close Causal Connection Between Dunbar’s Conduct and the Resulting Injury to Remick**

- The police report states that Marsha Gibson, the motorist who rear-ended Remick’s car, was driving under the speed limit at the time of the collision, that she did not see Remick’s unlit car until she was about 40 feet away because it was getting dark and his car was stopped just beyond a bend in the road, and that she tried to stop her car before hitting Remick’s but could not slow down enough to avoid a collision. *See* investigator’s memo.

- These facts are corroborated by other facts in the police report summarized in the investigator’s memo; for instance, skid marks measured at the scene of the accident indicate that Gibson immediately applied the brakes on her vehicle but was unable to avoid hitting Remick’s car.
- If Remick’s car had been on the shoulder, Gibson likely would not have rear-ended it.
- Likewise, it is reasonable to conclude that if the hazard lights on Dunbar’s truck had been flashing, Gibson likely would have seen Remick’s car sooner and might have been able to brake in time to avoid a collision. *Cf. Thomas* (if Good Samaritan golfer had not said he would make sure that his golfing partner got home safely, defendant golf course might have taken steps to prevent fatal car accident).
- Based on the facts presented and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, Remick can likely demonstrate the necessary causal connection between Dunbar’s breach of duty and Remick’s resulting injuries and car damage.
- Section 42 requires that an actor’s undertaking increase the risk of harm to another. Astute examinees may note that Dunbar could argue that Remick would have been in the same position if Dunbar hadn’t attempted to help him (i.e., stranded in his car on the highway), and that therefore Dunbar’s actions or inactions did not cause Remick any harm or increase Remick’s risk of harm because Gibson would have rear-ended Remick’s car anyway.
- The problem with that argument is that it assumes Remick would have remained in his unlit car even if Dunbar hadn’t come along and offered to help him.
- The concern Remick expressed to Dunbar about the fact that it was getting dark and his car was still stalled on the road suggests that he understood the risk of leaving the car there. Moreover, Remick’s awareness of the risk suggests that, had Dunbar not stopped, Remick would have managed to get out of his car and wait on the shoulder of the road for help. Had that been the case, then even if Gibson had rear-ended Remick’s car, Remick would have been no worse for wear physically, although his car would still have sustained damage. However, Dunbar, an experienced mechanic, “told [Remick] not to worry because [Dunbar] thought he could get the car started pretty quickly. [Remick] told [Dunbar] that [Remick] had emergency flares in the trunk; [Dunbar] said not to worry.” (Client interview.) Remick relied upon Dunbar’s expertise and his assurances that he could fix the mechanical issue with the car “pretty quickly.”

- All in all, the facts favor a finding of causation, and Remick could likely demonstrate that there was a “reasonable causal connection” between Dunbar’s conduct and Remick’s resulting injury and that, as required by § 42, Dunbar increased Remick’s risk of harm beyond the risk Remick would have faced had Dunbar not stopped to help him.

**D. Whether Remick Sustained Actual Loss or Damage Resulting from Dunbar’s Actions**

- As evidenced in the client interview transcript and the police report summary contained in the investigator’s memo, Remick sustained serious injuries as a result of the collision, including a concussion, dislocated shoulder, and broken arm.
- He will likely need surgery on his shoulder, he cannot use his left arm for at least a few more weeks, and he faces “several months” of rehabilitation due to his injuries.
- And, while only limited information is provided, it is clear from the client interview transcript that his ongoing injuries interfere with his ability to work and operate his landscaping business.
- His car also needs approximately \$4,500 in repairs.
- Examinees should conclude from these facts that Remick has satisfied the fourth and final requirement for stating a negligence claim and that his damages include both serious personal injury and significant property damage.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

Examinees should conclude that Remick *can* assert a viable cause of action for negligence against Dunbar under both § 42 and § 44 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Remick was stranded in a disabled vehicle, with an incapacitating ankle injury that made him “imperiled” and “helpless” under the circumstances. Dunbar offered, voluntarily, to help Remick, thereby assuming a duty to protect Remick and his car under § 42. Because Remick was “imperiled” and “helpless” within the meaning of § 44, Dunbar also owed Remick a duty to exercise reasonable care to secure Remick’s safety, but he failed to do so. Dunbar breached his duty to Remick, and Remick suffered a concussion, dislocated shoulder, and broken arm as a result of that breach. Because the facts establish all four elements for a negligence claim, Remick may proceed with a lawsuit against Dunbar.